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CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS

CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE INSTRUMENT'S WHERE
ADOPTED CHILDREN ARE CONCERNED: I
J. Wesl~y Oler*

I
INTRODUCTION

A. Nature of the Problem
HE institution of adoption is of ancient tradition, knowing primitive origin and tracing its history through many civilizations. Today its universality still bespeaks the human needs from which it springs.
Recent growth of statutory reforms, procedural and substantive,
in our adoption system reflects the increasing social interest of the state
in this field. Procedurally, extensive strides have been made to safeguard those directly concerned in adoption, and through them to protect the public in general. Substantively the lagging but nonetheless
noticeable trend is toward complete legal equivalence between relationship by adoption and relationship by blood. At present, however, such
equivalence is far from attained.
·
.
In this connection an engaging and important problem centers
around the question whether the adopted person or one related to him
is within the intendment of such words as "children," "issue" or
"heirs," as used in a will, deed or similar private instrument. In the
United States a century of adoption through judicial proceedings 1
has produced a sizeable body of law on this subject. It is the purpose of
this article to consider the decisions and statutes on the question.

T

* A.B., Dickinson College; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; LL.M., University
of Michigan Law School. Member of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia bars; author of
articles in Dickinson Law Review.-Ed.
1
Massachusetts is commonly credited with enacting in 18 5 1 the first statute in the
United States to provide for adoption of child~en by judicial proceedings. Mass. Acts &
Resolves, I 8 5 1, c. 3 24. Adoption of an heir by deed or declaration, however, subject
to due authentication and recording, had received statutory sanction in Texas in I 8 50.
Tex. Laws, 1849-1851, c. 39, approved January 16, 1850. For a similar statute in
Alabama, see Ala. Code (1852) § 2011. In Louisiana, which also felt the direct influence of the civil law, an article of the Civil Code of 1825 abolished "adoption which
was authorized by the laws heretofore in force." La. Civ. Code (1825) art. 232.
Adoption by private statute likewise existed in some states at a comparatively early date.
See, for example, Tex. Laws, 1839, p. 37, whereby John S. Roberts was "authorized
and allowed to adopt said John Finley Roberts as his son, and divide or .bequeath to him
an equal portion of his property, with the heir or heirs by him begotten."
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An obvious resemblance will be noted between this subject and the
one relating to whether general terms like "children" and "heirs,"
when employed in statutes, constitutions or other public documents,
shall be deemed to include adoptec:;s. The troublesome words are in
either case the same, and in the sense that the interpreter is seeking the
meaning of written language the problems tend to identify themselves.
Other factors, however, suggest the desirability of separate treatment
fqr each subject. With respect to private instruments a flexibility of construction from one case to another is permissible and in a• measure desirable; whereas in the interpretation of the legislative will a greater
uniformity of result is demanded by the generality and prospective
reach of statutory application. To the latter field, moreover, there is
constantly brought the doctrine of strict construction of legislative innovations in derogation of the common law. The propriety of invoking
an analogous maxim in the ·construction of private instruments is not
apparent. Failure to observe the distinction between the problem of an
adopted person's equivalence within terminology of statutes and within
language of private instruments has contributed its share of unfortunate
results.
Of the situations herein examined, the commonest involves the
question whether an adoptee 2 is embraced by the designation of a group
of persons, usually a class, to which, but for the adoption, he clearly
would not belong. To illustrate: T devises Blackacre to F for life,
remainder in fee simple absolute to the "children" of F who survive
him. F is survived by X ~nd Y, descendants in the first degree born to
him in lawful wedlock, and also by A, whom he adopted as his child,
but who was unrelated to him before the adoption. In partition proceedings A contends that he is, and X and Y argue that he is not, one
of the "children" of F within the meaning of the will. Conceivably
even the contingency of an adoption may require the court's attention
in a situation within this general category. Suppose, for example, in a
judsdiction recognizing for some purposes that possibility of issue may
become extinct before the ancestor's death, arid permitting the termination of a trust on motion of all interested beneficiaries, if they are sui
juris and no material purpose would be subserved by continuation of
the trust, a settlement is made for the benefit of M for life, and i~ is
directed that at M's death the trustee shall turn over the corpus to
2 For purposes of this article the term "adoptee," meaning an adopted person gen•
erally, has the utility of brevity and may also avoid unintended connotations as to age,
equivalence, etc., which might be involved in a reference to an "adopted child." As a
balancing term the word "adopter" is also employed herein and indicates an adoptive
parent.
'
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M's "children" absolutely. M, a woman sui juris and seventy-five years
of age, whose incapacity to bear children again has been established by
competent evidence, joins in a petition for termination of the trust with
S, also sui juris, who is the only child ever to have been born to M.
The trustee opposes on the ground that M may thereafter legally adopt
a person who will be one of her "children" within the contemplation of
the settlement.8
A second situation is the converse of the first and involves the
question whether a person who would manifestly come within a general
designation is to be deemed excluded therefrom by reason of his being
adopted. So, a devise of Blackacre to F for life, remainder in fee simple
absolute to the "children" of F who survive him, may give rise to th~
problem whether A, a child born to Fin lawful wedlock, but adopted by
another person during F's life, is to be deemed one of the "children"
of F within the meaning of the devise. This is not a common problem.
Another type of case is easily imagined in which the question is
whether persons related to an adoptee are within a general designation
in a private instrument: as where, under a devise of Blackacre to F's
"grandchildren," a claimant is (a) a child born in lawful wedlock to A,
a person adopted by F; or (b) a child of F's child, A, where A had
been adopted by a stranger.4 Instances of this kind are few, however,
and it is thought that for the most part the applicable principles do not
differ materially from those governing, respectively, the situations mentioned in the two paragraphs immediately preceding. 5
Of the kinds of private instruments out of which litigation on the
selected subject has arisen, wills greatly predominate. Cases involving
other private instruments, such as deeds, trust agreements, and insurance policies, are not numerous and usually, though not always, turn on
the same considerations as the will cases. 6
8

Cf. 7 CAL. L. REV. 353 (1919).
For a related discussion, see annotation on .right of childr:en of adopted child to
take share which parent would have taken under a will if he had survived the testator.
8 A.L.R. 1012 (1920).
5
Such appears to be the view taken by the American Law Institute. See 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 291, comment e (1940).
6
This is not to be taken as suggesting, however, that differences in construction
principles as between wills and other private instruments are wholly lacking or without
significance. Instances in which the court stressed the circumstance, in connection with
the present subject, that the instrument involved was a deed and required stricter construction than l1 will, are afforded by Uitz v. Upham, 177 Mich. 351, 143 N.W. 66
(1913) and Ahlmeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J.L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), motion to strike
out grounds of appeal granted in part and denied in part (N.J. 1926) 133 A. 880,
affirmed 103 N.J.L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1927).
4.
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B. Restri~tions on Scope of Discussion
Adoption pursuant to statutory sanction carries with it legislatively
declared effects peculiar to itself. It is beyond the scope of the present
discussion to consider the extent to which the identification of class
members under private instruments is affected by abortive attempts at
adoption or by quasi-adoption relations which are not tantamount to
adoption in its full sense. 7
It is also believed that the effect of adoption upon the identification
of general designees in private instruments becomes controversial only
if the words of designation are employed as words of purchase rather
than of limitation. Accordingly, the preliminary question whether
terms are used as words of limitation or of purchase is not discussed
here.8.
As with other aspects of adoption, so with the subject at hand, the
conflict of laws frequently plays an incidental role. Herein such reference only is made to the conflict of laws problem as may be esse1_1tial
to a comprehension of the facts or results in a particular case, and it is
assumed that the court's conclusion was correct with respect to what
jurisdiction's law should be applied.
Fact9rs quite apart from adoption may lead to an adoptee's inclusion or exclusion from a designated class. It is possible, for example,
that his elimination· from the group may be predicated on the closing
of the class under "a rule of convenience" 9 prior to his adoption. Matters of this nature are not within the sphere of discussion which follows.
C. Mode of Analysis
It is explicit in most of the decisions and implicit in the rest that the
question whether an adoptee is comprehended by a given designation
in a private instrument turns on the "intention" of the instrument's
maker. A real intention, of course, is seldom discoverable. The "intention" to which reference is made must often be supplied by the courts
"to fill up a casus omissi," 10 and largely represents a union of judicially
envisaged social desirability with conjecture as to what the conveyor
7

For a case on the point_ thus excluded, see Day v. Webler, 93 Conn. 308, 105 A.
618 ( 1919).
8
As later explained, this should be a matter of importance to the courts when considering the effect of statutory provisions that an adoptee shall not be capable of inheriting or taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adopting
parent or parents.
9
On the meaning of the quoted expression, see Casner, "Class Gifts to Others than
to 'Heirs' or 'Next of Kin'-Increase in the Class Membership," 51 HARV. L. REv.
254 d 263 (1937).
10 GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW,§ 370 (1909).
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probably would have intended had he thought about the matter. However this may be, to ascertain "intention" the court usually must concern itself with a number of interplaying factors which vary in weight
from case to case. Anyone attempting an analysis of the decisions is thus
confronted immediately with classification problems. Different bases
for fundamental division of the cases, according to the emphasis, real or
imagined, placed upon this factor or that, readily suggest themselves.
One such primary arrangement of the decisions pursues a division
provoked by two complementary rules of construction, the respective
application of which depends upon whether the conveyor is or is not the
adopter. Indeed, this basis of division has acquired a patina of authenticity to which it is not believed in reason to be entitled.11
Other bases of primary classification might stress the time of the
adoption in relation to the execution or effective date of the instrument,
or the conveyor's knowledge or ignorance of the adoption, or the particular terminology of class designation.12
It is believed that no master key, such as might be suggested by the
classifications just mentioned, fits all the decisions, and that a better
balanced appreciation of the over-all picture will be gained by developing the subject from several points of view. The discussion, therefore,
will be made to center first around particular words of designation,
such as "children," "issue," and "heirs," standing alone. Next in order
the context and circumstances surrounding the use of the words of
designation will be considered. Thereafter attention will be directed to
some of the special constructional preferences and rules of construction,
useful where other steps in the interpretive process fail entirely or require support. When deemed desirable, occasional departures from this
order of development will be taken, leading to a degree of overlapping,
but the general pattern of the discussion will be along the lines indicated.
D. Statutory Roles
As might be expected, provisions of the adoption statutes pervade
the whole of this subject. The roles which these provisions play are
at least three.
11

An example of its employment may be found in annotations in 70 A.L.R. 621
(1931) and 144 A.L.R. 670 (1943).
12
The last mentioned method of classifying the decisions is employed, for instance, in 69 CORPUS Jums, Wills, §§ 1197, 1200, 1226, 1234, 1245, 1254. See
also 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 265 {comments d and e), 287, 288, 291 {comments a, b, d, e, i, and m, and illustration 3), 292 (comments a and g), 293 (com·ments a~ b, and e), 305 (comments k;y and bb, and illustration 15), 306 (comment g)
and 307 {comment g) (1940).
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First, by its terms an adoption statute may prescribe more or less
specifically the effect which adoption shall have with respect to identification under particular designations employed in private instruments.13
Second, by investing an adoptee with a particular status only, such as
that of a "child" or an "heir" of the adopter, the statute may have an
exclusionary effect, for it may thereby establish, in conjunction with the
principle of construction whereby words are normally construed according to their plain meaning, that the adoptee is not within a designation
employed in, a private instrument. So, if by the statute an adoptee is
made the "heir" of the adopter, but otherwise the relation of parent and
child is not created between them, the statute exerts a negative force
toward excluding the adoptee from benefits -of a gift to the adopter's
"children." 14
Third, by investing an adoptee with a particular status, such as that
of a "child" of the adopter, the statute may have the inclusionary effect
of tending to bring the adoptee within a designation. Thus, if the
statute declares that the a<;loptee shall be deemed a "child" of the adopt. ing parents as fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock, it is
properly one of the circumstances in the light of which a devise to the
"children" of the adopting parents should be .read. Where it is the
sole surrounding circumstance of any materiality, the argument may be
advanced that it supplies the conveyor's meaning.

II
RESORT TO LANGUAGE AND CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Normal or Technical Meaning of Certain Words; Statutory Role
In general
In the typical situation, where the problem is whether a person's
adopted child is included by a reference in a will to his "children,"
"issue," "heirs" or other relations, the single word or phrase of designa,tion which is thus emploY._ed may have inherent force of its own to help
decide the question. Words, it is said, are to be construed according to
their primary or ordinary meaning, and technical terms are to be taken
in their technical sense. H in the ordinary or technical meaning of the
word there is a connotation of blood relationship, this will have its own
persuasiveness against inclusion of an adoptee within the term. ConI.

13 E.g., Saskatchewan (Can.) Rev. Stat. (1940), c. 278, § 86: "The word 'child'
or its equivalent in any instrument shall include an adopted child unless the contrary
plainly appears by the terms of the instrument."
14
Cf. Kales, "Rights of Adopted Children," 9 ILL. L. REv. 149 at l 60 ( 1914).
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versely, if the word of designation has acquired a statutory significance
independent of implications of blood connection, as may be true of the
word "heirs," this can operate in favor of inclusion of an adoptee within
the designation. The matter is largely one of definition, and as such
is subject to the tyranny of the definer. If a court declares that th~
word "children" normally imports a relationship by blood, who will
poll the public mind to determine the accuracy of the declaration?
In its relation to the question whether an adoptee is comprehended
by a term of designation in a will or other private instrument, the
asserted common or technical usage 'of the word may influence the
decision in different ways. It may be invoked as a basis for saying there
is no ambiguity at all in the word, thus destroying the heart of the controversy. Or, if the ambiguity in the term be conceded, the ordinary or
technical meaning may control the result for want of any countervailing
consideration in the context or surrounding circumstances. Or, where
factors of context and circumstances are invofved, the prima facie meaning may be considered along with them and tip the scales in one direction or another, where otherwise there would be equipoise.
Two of the roles played by the adoption statutes relate to the ordinary or technical meaning of such a word of designation as "children"
or "heirs." So, if the statute qualifies an adoptee as an heir but not as a
child of the adopter, this may strengthen the position of a court which
declares that in normal usage the word "children" excludes an adoptee.
But if the statute bestows on the adoptee the status, for example, of a
child of the adopter, the court may regard the law itself as supplying to
the word "children" a prima facie meaning, inclusive of an adoptee.
2.

"Child or children"

The terms which, viewed alone, have given courts the most trouble
in determining whether a person otherwise unidentified by a designation is by adoption brought within its scope are the words "child" and
"children" or such words as, by preliminary construction, are determined to have been synonymous with "child" or "children" in the conveyor's mind.15 These words are considered at this point in their in15 Instances in which terms of designation other than "child" or "children' were
deemed to have been employed as synonyms therefore include Middletown Trust Co. v.
Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, I 12 A. 689 (1921) ("issue"); Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377,
24 S.E. (2d) 381 (1943) ("heirs"); Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956
(1910) ("heirs"~; Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E. 588 (1917)
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dividual relation to the general subject.16
As a basis for denying that a person related only by adoption is
within the term "child" or "children" as used in a will, deed or similar
instrument, it is sometimes asserted in substance that the ordinary, natural, normal or primary meaning of the word connotes relationship by
blood and excludes adopted children.17 Thus we :find the New York
Court of Appeals in Matter of Leask 18 declaring with confidence, as to
the intention of a testator in creating a trust for the benefit of his
nephew for life, with remainder, on the nephew's death leaving child or
children surviving him, to such child or children:
"The words 'leaving a child or children' as used by the testator had reference to the natural offspring of the life beneficiary
-to a child or children born to him in wedlock and who should
survive him. The testator contemplated actual parentage-a relation dependent upon the operation of natural laws in marital intercourse and which could not arise without the intervention of natural laws favorable to the procreation and birth of offspring. In
this respect it differs essentially from the relation of adoptive
parentage which may be established by the voluntary act_ of the
parties thereto. What Hudson Hoagland meant in substance was
the same as though he had said: If God, in his good providence,
shall give my nephew, Thomas C. Hoagland, a child or children
who shall survive him, etc., then they should receive the principal
("heirs"); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 ( 1930) ("heirs,"
"direct heirs"); Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924) ("legal
heirs").
_
16
Treated infra, III, B, 2, is the connected question of the presumptive meaning
of "child" or "children" as dependent upon whether the term refers, respectively, to
the child or children of the conveyor, or of another,person.
_
17
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Comer v.
Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d) 420 (1942) ;, Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 24
S.E. (2d) 381 (1943); Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925);
Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930); Russell v. Musson, 240
Mich. 631,216 N.W. 428 (1927); Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d)
660 (1941); Melek v. Curator~ of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W.
614 (1923); Parker v. Carpenter, 77 N.H. 453, 92 A. 955 (1915); Matter of Leask,
197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910); Matter of Conant's Estate, 144 Misc. 743, 259
N.Y.S. 885 (1932); Albright v. Albright;u6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927);
Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601 (1918); Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178,
126 A. 254 (1924); Corr's Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 76 (1940); Freeman's
Estate (No. 1), 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909); Thorp's Estate, 90 Pitts. (Pa.) L.J. 493
(1942); Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76, 151 A. 131 (1930). The same
thought was expressed, although only by way of concession for purposes of argument,
in Martin v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 73 Me. 25 (1881), and Kemp v. N.Y. Produce Exchange, 34 App. Div. 175, 54 N.Y.S. 678 (1898). And see the dissenting opinion of
Wiley, C.J., in Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899).
18
197 N.Y. 193 at 196, 197, 90 N.E. 652 (1910).
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sum of twenty-five thousand dollars of which the father was given
the income for life. He did not mean that if this nephew should
adopt a child who survived him that such child should take. Other
language would have been used if he had intended thus to confer
upon Thomas C. Hoagland a virtual power of appointment. The
phrase 'leaving a child or children' is not one which would naturally be used in reference to an adopted child or children. 'Having
adopted a child or children who survived him' or some similar
phraseology would have been employed if it had been the intention
of the testator to include children by adoption in the qualifying
clause under consideration."
In the Leask case the court's conclusion as to the normal meaning
of "child or children" was in the nature of a dictum, for the decision
could have been and ultimately was predicated on an express statutory
provision declaring in effect that the right of remaindermen under a
limitation over, dependent upon the adopter's dying without heirs,
should not be defeated by deeming an adoptee to be the adopter's child.
Definition according to so-called normal meaning can be sufficient in
itself, however, to shape the result, as it did in Parker v. Carpenter,19
where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had to construe a will
creating a trust of the residuary estate in favor equally of the testator's
two sons, Charles and William, during the life of each, with provision
that on the death of either the trustee should pay over half of the ·
principal in equal shares to the children of the deceased son and their
heirs, the issue of any deceased child or children to receive the share or
shares of such child or children. When William died without having
had a natural child, but leaving the defendant Bean, whom he had
adopted after the testator's death, the court in this summary language
denied the adoptee's claim to half of the principal:
"The defendant Bean takes nothing under the will of . . .
[ the testator], for she is not William's child within the ordinary
meaning of the word, and there is nothing to rebut the presumption that . . . [testator] intend~d to give that word its ordinary
meaning." 20
By way of contrast it is interesting to discover that even sixty years
ago the Supreme Court of Alabama had no difficulty in concluding
that, absent language in the adopting statute confining the ,adoptee's
rights to those of inheritance, it would have been the probable "duty"
19
20

77 N.H. 453, 92 A. 955 (1915).
Id., 77 N.H. at 454.
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of the court to hold that an adopted child took under the term "children" in a will, for the reason that by dictionary definition adoption is
"an act by which a person appoints as his heir the child of another," and
means "to receive and to treat as a son or daughter one who is the child
of another," and "to take into one's family as son and heir; to take and
treat as a child, giving a title to the privileges and rights of a child." 21
To this thought, then expressed, can be added now the further one that
by a century of development in states with a background of common
law the institution of adoption, though not indigenous to us, has become "naturalized" here and is an important and familiar adjunct of
our society and our law. 22 It ca~ot be dismissed as involving the unusual.
There is ample room for argument, moreover, that among the
adoption laws in the United States which do not expressly provide a
presumption to aid in resolving the question whether an adoptee is to
be deemed within the term ."child" or "children" in a private instrument,28 there are many statutes which can be construed to imply a presumption in favor of inclusion of an adoptee within the meaning of
these words. And although such a presumption, if found, would not
necessarily determfoe a conveyor's intention, it would have its significance nevertheless. The danger exists that courts may overlook the possibility of the presumption. That danger is heighteried by circumstances
now to be explained.
·
First, a person not otherwise within the designation "child" or
"children," w.ho would establish his pqsition as such by virtue of adoption, must elevate himself to the claimed status through the adoption
statute. In this respect, however, the statutory language may fail him;
21 Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48 at 51, 3 S. 900 (1887). See also Bray v. Miles,
23 Ind. App. 432 at 437, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899), where the court cites
with apparent approval ·a statement in 5 AM. & ENo. ENcY.' OF LAW 1078, that the
word "child" or "children" usually includes an adopted child. This statement is said
in Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925) to lack the support of
the cases cited for it.
22 "Although there is no way by which 'we can determine with accuracy the exact
number of children adopted in a single year, the widespread popularity of this subject
in the magazines, newspapers, on the screen, and over the radio has made us think of it
as 'big business' in the United States today. The U.S. Children's Bureau in 1936
estimated on the basis of actual figures from nine selected states that at least 16,000
chiJdren were adopted in the United States in a single year. As these selected states did
not include New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, or Ohio where it is known that many
adoptions occur, the true figure is probably even higher than this estimate." Berkley
and Colby, "Problems in Safeguarding Adoptions," 23 JouRNAL OF PEDIATRICS 344
(1943).
28 For a discussion of the express statutory rules of construction, see infra, III, B, I.
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it may elevate him to a lesser status than that of a child and there leave
him. Whether or not it does so is a matter of statutory construction.
Second, the situation to which reference has just been made, where
the statute falls short of raising the adoptee to a child's status, is the one
with which courts heretofore have been most frequently confronted.
Russell v. Russell,24 decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama in·
I 887, illustrates the point. It arose on a bill in equity to construe a will,
dated I 870, in which the testator declared that he gave two-thirds of
his real and personal estate to his children and the rest to his wife.
When he executed the instrument he had one child living and his wife
was enceinte with another, but it was not born alive and she gave birth
to no other children. In I 885 the testator adopted A pursuant to a
statute which provided that any person desirous of adopting a child,
"so as to make it capable of inheriting his estate, real and personal, 01;to change the name of one previously adopted," might make a declaration in writing, which, upon q.ue acknowledgment, should have "the
effect to make such child capable of inheriting such estate of the declarant, and of changing its name to the one stated in the declaration."
After the testator's death in I 8 86, A claimed a third of the estate as one
of the testator's "children" within the meaning of the will. With
reluctance the court rejected A's claim, principally on the ground that
the adoption statute, upon which A had to rely, raised him to the st?,tus
of an heir but not a child of the testator.
In Schafer v. Eneu, 25 of still earlier date, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania dealt with a similar statute and an analogous testamentary
provision. The will, executed about I 8 50, provided for the holding of a
ground rent in trust for the benefit of the testator's daughter for life
and directed that at her death it should be conveyed to her children
and the heirs of her children forever. His residuary estate the testator
gave to his own children. Thereafter, in I 855, the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted the first adoption statute known to that commonwealth.
By it a person desiring to adopt a child as his "heir" or as "one of his
heirs" was permitted to petition the court by way of a declaration of
such desire and of his intention to perform all the duties of a parent
to such child, and the court was authorized to decree that the child
should assume the name of the adopting parent and have all the rights
of a child and heir of the adopting parent and be subject to all the
duties of such child. (In paraphrasing the statute the court did not
mention the portion thereof conferring rights of a "child" but only
24
25

84 Ala. 48, 3 S. 900 (1887).
54 Pa. 304 (1867).
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indicated bestowal of rights of an "heir.") Provision was also made by
the statute for equal inheritance among the adopter's other children
and the adoptee in event of intestacy, and for inheritance from and
through each other as if all had been lawful children of the same
parents. Under this statute, which from its terms could be construed to
bring an adoptee to the status of an heir only, the testator's daughter,
who had no children born to her, adopted three minors, the last one
only a day before she died. To recover ground rent the testator's children and children of his deceased children, but not the adoptees,
brought an action of covenant after the daughter's death against the
grantee-obligor, who defended on the theory that the rent was payable
to the adoptees as "children" of the testator's daughter within the
meaning of the will. With respect to this the court made its oft-quoted
pronouncement:- " ... Adopted children are not children of the person by whom
they have been adopted, and the Act of Assembly does not attempt the impossibility of making them such. . . . The right to
inherit from the adopting parent is made complete, but the identity of the child is not changed. One adopted has the rights of a
child without being a child." 20
And in varying degrees of reliance upon that line of reasoning the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Puterbaugh's Estate,21 Yates's
Estate,2 8 and Carr's Estate,20 and the Pennsylvania Superior Court 80
have held that the Pennsylvania statute does not make an adoptee a
"child" of the adopter within the meaning of private instruments.81
The decision reached by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in
Cochran v. Cochran 82 is explainable on the same ground. Perhaps this
may also be said of some cases in Kentucky and Michigan. 88
26

Id. at 306.
261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601 (1918).
28
281 Pa. 178, 126 A. 254 (1924).
29
338 Pa. 337, 12 A. (2d) 75 (1940).
so Freeman's Estate (No. 1), 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909).
81
As to wills taking effect after December 31, 1917, there is now a statutory presumption with respect to the matter in Pennsylvania. See Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1938) tit. 20, §§ 227, 228.
82
43 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 95 S.W. 731 (1906). The pertinent statute provided
for the adoption by deed of one person as another's "legal heir," who should thereafter
have all the rights and privileges of a "legal heir" of the adopter.
83
In Sanders v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24; 128 S.W. (2d) 223 (1939), the statute
apparently provided that a court should have authority to make an order "declaring
such person to be the heir-at-law of such petitioner." Savells v. Brown, 187 Ky. 134,
218 S.W. 462 (1920), is perhaps to be considered in this light likewise. In Russell v.
27
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At present a few states still have statutes which, aside from providing for a change of name, purport to do little more than elevate the
adoptee to a degree of heirship. In South Carolina, for example, the
statute merely provides in this respect that a person desirous of adopting a child and conferring upon it the right to inherit from the adopter
as his lawful child may file a petition for that purpose in the court of
common pleas, and by virtue of the decree the child shall be entitled
to inherit from him as his lawful child.84
The same situation prevails in some states as regards adoption of an
heir at law by deed or declaration 85 or the adoption of an adult for inheritance purposes. 86
In Florida the emphasis also seems to be upon heirship, the statute
providing that an adopted child shall be decreed the child and heir at
law of the adopter. 87 This is no more than is declared by the Pennsylvania statute,88 which, as already indicated, has been construed to make
the adoptee an heir but not a child of the adopter.
In New Mexico the statute as to adoption of minors is so barren in
its status-conferring provisions as to give the impression of being defective. It prnvides merely for change of the adoptee's 1?-ame and release of the natural parents from parental rights and duties.89 And
through an apparent inadvertence in amending the Connecticut statute
in I 943, the legislature there eliminated all provisions as to the status
of a minor adoptee except those as to inheritance.40
Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927), the statute, while providing that the
adopter should stand in the place of a parent to the child, merely declared, as regards
the adoptee himself, that he should become the adopter's "heir-at-law'' as though in fact
the adopter's child. The Michigan statute is still in this form. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1943) § 27.3178 (545).
84
S.C. Code Ann. ( I 942) § 8679.
85
See, for instance, Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 4361. And compare the Ohio
provisions for designation of an heir at law. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Supp. 1943)
§ 10503-12.
86
See, for instance, Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, I 93 5) c. 4, § 6. And compare the
New Jersey provisions for adoption of an adult. N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 2:39-5,
2 :39-7.
37
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 72.06. See also Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 731.30.
88
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 1, § 4. By express statutory provision, however, an adoptee may sometimes take as a "child" under a will in Pennsylvania. Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 20, §§ 227, 228.
89
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 25-210, 25-211. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1941) § 25-218, which gives an adult adoptee all the rights of a natural child of the
adopter.
4
°Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1943) § 653g repealed Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §
4810, which in addition to conferring certain inheritance rights had declared that the
adoptee should be the legal child of the adopter and the adopter should be the legal
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In Mississippi the adoption decree may confer upon the adoptee the
benefits proposed in the petition for adoption,41 which obviously may
be limited. In Wyoming the adoptee's status may be restricted by
agreement of the parties.42 And in Tennessee the adopted child's position after adoption may be affected by special terms of the adoption
decree.48
In other states, too, altp.ough the adoption statutes are not so restrictive as those to which advertence has been made, there are enumer- .
ative expressions in the laws which can be seized upon to reach a
conclusion, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
that the statute does not lift the adoptee to a child's status. Thus, in
Alabama,44 Arkansas,45 New Jersey,4° Ohio,47 and West Virginia,48
the portion of the statute defining the effect of the adoption decree in
terms invests the adoptee, as regards the adopter, with rights, privileges, obligations and relations merely as to "education," "maintenance," and "inheritance." Indiana 49 and Maine 50 statutes are in much
the same. condition. The limited scope of such_ laws is a factor which
must not be disregarded in appraising decisions from any of these jurisparent of the adoptee, with all the rights and duties between them of a _legitimate
parent and child. Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1943) § 652g provides for inheritance, but
neither it nor other sections of the amending act relate to the adoptee's status.
41
Miss. Code Ann. ( l 942) § 1269.
42
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 20-210. In the absence of such
an agreement a minor adoptee is entitled to the same rights of person and property as
children or heirs at law of the adopters. Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931)
§ 20-215.,
48
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 9569. Unless expressly prov.ided otherwise by the decree, however, the adoption confers upon the adoptee all the privileges
of a legitimate child of the adopter, including rights of inheritance from him. Tenn.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 9570. See also Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 80, § 38.
44
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 27, § 5.
45
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Supp. 1944) § 262.
46
N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 9:3-9. This relates to the adoption of minors.
For the effect of adoption of an adult, see N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:39-7.
47
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 10512-23.
48
W.Va. Acts, 1943, p. 153·
49
As regards the affirmative status of the adoptee, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1943)
§§ 3-121, 3-122, merely combine to provide that the adoptee shall be entitled to receive .all rights and interests in ,the estate of the adopter by descent or otherwise as the
natural heir of the adopter would, and render the adopter liable for the adoptee's
maintenance and education.
50 Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 80, § 38, declaring the legal effect of adoption of a
child, provides that the adoptee is, "for the custody of the person and right of obedience
and maintenance, to all intents and purposes, the child of his adopters, with right of
inheritance when not otherwise expressly provided in the decree of adoption, the same
as if born to them in lawful wedlock," with certain exceptions stated.
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dictions in so far as they may deny to an adoptee the equivalence of a
child of the adopter within the meaning of a private instrument.u It
is a factor that likewise should be taken into account in evaluating Missouri cases decided under earlier statutory provisions which invested
the adoptee with limited inheritance rights only and a claim against the
adopter for support, maintenance and humane treatment, but which, as
the Georgia statute still does, 52 declared that the effect of the adoption
should not extend to third persons. 58
·
Other adoption statutes, however, in growing number, do not restrict the status of the adoptee to that of an heir of the adopter or to that
of a child for purposes of enumerated benefits only. The trend is toward making the adopted child a child of the adopter to all intents and
purposes. Thus, in upwards of twenty-five jurisdictions, including a few
already mentioned as having narrow statutory provisions with respect
to the actual effect of the adoption, the portion of the adoption statute
relative to the making of the decree provides for a declaration therein
that the adoptee shall be the child of the adopter "to all legal intents
and purposes," 54 or that he shall be regarded and treated "in all respects" as the child of the adopter, 55 or that the rights, duties, privileges
51

See Pierce v. Fa~ers State Bank, (Ind. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 480; Nickerson
v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, II5 N.E. 588 (1917); Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App.
166, !46 N.E. 123 (1925); Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 8~1 (1907);
Wilder v. Butler, II6 Me. 389, 102 A. I IO (1917); Stout v. Cook, 77 N.J. Eq. 153,
75 A. 583 (1910), for other reasons reversed in part, 79 N.J. Eq. 573, 81 A. 821
(19II), and affirmed in part, 79 N.J. Eq. 640, 81 A. 824 (19II); Ahlmeyer y.
Miller, 102 N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), affirmed 103 N.J. L. 617, 137 'A. 543
(1927); Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Albright v. Albright, u6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App.
198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932). The narrow wording of the statutes involved is noted in
the Nickerson, Wilder, Stout, and Albright cases.
52
Ga. Code (Supp. 1943) § 74-414.
58
Leeper v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941); Melek v.
Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W. 614 (1923).
H Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 27, §4; Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) § II46; Ariz.
Code Ann. (1939) § 27-207; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 261; _Colo. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1935) c. 4, § 4; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3551, as amended, Del. Laws,
1937, p. 618 ("to all legal intents and purposes whatsoever"); Haw. Rev. Laws (1935)
§4525; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 4, § 3; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1942) § 4839.48; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 9613; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942)
c. 345, § 4, as amended, N.H. Laws, 1943, p. 176; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 10,
§ 50; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 63-406; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 420,
§ 5; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 322.05.
55
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 31-II07; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929)
§ 9479; N.Y. Domestic Relations Law (Supp. 1944) § I 14; S.D. Code (1939)
§ 14.0406; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 14-4-9.
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and relations between the adoptee and adopters shall "in all respects"
be those of a child born in lawful wedlock. 56
More important, the statutes themselves in many jurisdictions give
direct and sweeping effect to the adoption decree, declaring that by
virtue of it the adoptee shall become a child of the adopters, as though
born to them in lawful wedlock, ri:ot only for purposes of inheritance,
but also "for all other purposes," 57 or "for all other legal consequences," 58 or "for every purpose," 59 or "for all other purposes whatsoever," 60 or "to all intents and purposes," 61 or "to all intents and purposes and for all legal incidents," 62 or "as respects all legal consequences and incidents," 63 or "for all purposes," 6 4, or as to "all rights,
duties and other legal consequences," 65 or as to "ail other incidents." ~6
In some states the provision is that after the decree the adopter
and adoptee shall sustain toward each other the legal relation of parent
and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that
relation. 67 This is akin to a provision that, in addition to the right of
inheritance, the rights, duties and relationships,68 or the rights, duties
and obligations,69 shall be the same between the adoptee and adopter as
56

N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 9:3-7; W. Va. Acts, 1943, pp. 151-152.
Haw. Rev. Laws (1935) § 4527.
58
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 405.200.
59
, Mo. Rev. Stat, Ann. (1942) § 9614; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925)
art. 46a.
60
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 48-6.
61
Ariz. Code Ann. ( l 93 9) § 27-208; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 193 5) c. 4, §
5; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3551, as amended, Del. Laws, 1937, p. 618; Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5333h.
62
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 1699-13.
63
Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) § u47; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 4448;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 63-407; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 420, § 6;
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 322.07.
6
4, D.C. Code (1940) § 16-205.
65
Neb. Laws, 1943, c. 104, § 8.
66
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 345, § 5.
67
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 228; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 31-I108;
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (A,nderson and McFarland, 1935) § 5863; Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929) § 9480; N.Y. Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, 1941) § II 5;
Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. IO,§ 51; S.D. Code (1939) § 14.0407, as amended, S.D.
Laws, 1943, c. 50; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 14-4-10. This is also the provision in
Georgia, but the proviso is added that as to all other persons than the adopter the
adoptee shall stand as if the adoption had not occurred. Ga. Code (Supp. 1943)
§ 74-414.
68
Iowa Code (Reichman, 1939) § 10501.6. Minn. Stat. (1941) § 259.07 is
similar.
•
69
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3336, as amended, Vt. Laws, 1941, p. 61. See also
N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 25-218, relating to the status of adult adoptees.
57
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though the former were the child of the latter by lawful birth. It also
resembles a statutory declaration that the adoptee shall be entitled to
the same rights of person and property as a natural child of the
adopter. 70
When the question is whether an adoptee is a "child" of the adopter
within the contemplation of a will, deed or similar instrument, statutes
of the wide scope to which allusion has been made should be distinguished from the others, which create a status of heirship only or
otherwise narrowly confine the adoptee's position. The distinction is
one which the more perceptive opinions observe. Sometimes, however,
it is neglected or not given due weight.
By coincidence the original Massachusetts statute, first among those
enacted in states with legal systems of practically pure common-law
genesis, was most unstinting in the terms it employed to place the
adoptee in the position of a child of the adopter. It provide~ that the
adoptee should "be deemed for the purposes of inheritance and succession . . . and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parent and child, the same to all intents and purposes as
if such child has been born in lawful wedlock of such parent or parents
by adoption," with an exception as to -inheritance of property expressly
limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of the adopter or ~dopters. 71
Under the statute in substantially this form the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Sewall v. Roberts 12 had no difficulty in reaching the
conclusion that an adopted daughter was a "child" of the adopter
within the meaning of a trust instrument whereby the adopter, through
the administrators of his father's estate, effected a settlement for the
benefit of himself for life, with direction that at his death the corpus
should be paid to his personal representatives in trust for the benefit of
his child or children. The language of the statute was observed to be
"very broad and comprehensive." The legislature seemed to have so
regarded it also, and in r 876 expressly limited it, so that in the construction of a grant, trust, settlement, entail, devise or bequest the term
"child" or its equivalent should presumptively exclude an adopted child
if the settlor, grantor or testator was not himself the adopting parent. 73
Unrestricted by such an amendment, the wide language of the
original Massachusetts statute and others like it can reasonably be
taken to supply a prima facie meaning for "child," when used in a .
7

° Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp.

71

72
78

1943) § 59-2103.
Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1851, c. 324.
115 Mass. 262 (1874).
Mass. Acts, 1876, c. 213, § 9·

•
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private instrument, which would include an adoptee. This is indicated
by Sewall v. Roberts, supra, and it is the conclusion reached or suggested in some other cases, both where the conveyor himself was the
adopter 74 and where he was not.7 5 In New Zealand no serious question
seems ever to have existed but that the statute there should be so interpreted.76
_
In the New Jersey case of Haver v. Herder 77 the testator's will, executed in 1899, devised a farm to his son G_ for life and directed that
at G's death the farm should go to G's legal heirs ( construed by the
court to mean "children"), if he should leave any; otherwise the farm
was to be sold and the proceeds divided among the testator's qther sons
and their heirs. The testator died in 1909. In 1911 G adopted A and
subsequently died. In a controversy between A and the children of the
testator's other sons as to who took the farm in remainder, Vice Chancellor Buchanan, finding no clues to the testator's intention from the
context or surrounding circumstances, fek obliged to resort to a rule of
construction and said: .
"· .. Such a rule may be formulated as follows: That where a
testator, by a will executed and probated during the existence of
our statute as to adoption, devises property to a class designated as
'heirs,' 'lawful heirs,' or 'legal heirs,' (in cases where, prior to the
statute of adoption, such words would have been held to mean
'children ...'), he must be deemed, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary elsewhere in the will or surrounding circumstances_,
to have intended to include within such class children adopted
pursuant to such statute, as well as natural born children or grandchildren....
74

o

See Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 A. 520 (1903); Von Beck v. Thomsen,
44 App. Div. 373, 60 N.Y.S. 1094 (1899), affirmed 167 N.Y. 601, 60 N.E. I121
(1901); Kemp v. N.Y. Produce Exchange, 34 App. Div. 175, 54 N.Y.S. 678 (1898).
75 See Tirrell v. Bacon, (C.C. :j'vlass. 1880) 3 F. @2; Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel,
105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927); Munie v. Gruenwald, 289 Ill. 468, 124 N.E.
605 (1919); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App: 432, 54 N.E.,446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899);
St. Louis Union Trust Co. Y. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934); Haver v.
Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924); Tankersley v. Davis, 195 N.C. 542,
142 S.E. 765 (1928); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E. (2,d) 621 (1943);
Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896); In re Olney, 27 R.I. 495, 63 A.
956 (1906). See also the dissenting opinions of Beach, J., in Middletown Trust Co.
v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 (1921), and of Orr, J., in Moffet v. Cash; 346
Ill. 311, 179 N.E: 186 (1931).
76 See Public Trustee v. Pilkington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 770 (1912); In re a
Deed of Trust, Peddle v. Beattie, (1933) N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 6g6; In re Horiana Kingi,
Thompson v. Eruiti Tamahau Kingi, (1937) N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 1025; In re Jackson,
Holmes v. Public Trustee, (1942) N.Z.L.R. (S.C. & C.A.) 682.
77
96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924).
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"Either this rule or its opposite must needs be adopted, and
the adoption of the rule as above stated, rather than its opposite, in
my view, is in accord with ... the spirit of the legislative policy
( as indicated in the adoption statute) ...." 78
Considering the rather restrictive nature of the New Jersey adoption statute, in so far as it confers status upon the adoptee, this may not
have been the correct conclusion for that jurisdiction, but it suggests an
acceptable presumption where the statute gives an adoptee a child's
status generally.
Such a presumption, of course, should be rebuttable. Its weight
should not be great and its function should probably be co11-fined to (a)
constituting one of the factors considered among others in ascertaining·
intention and (b) neutralizing and replacing the asserted primary meaning of blood relationship involved in the word "child" or "children"
where the context and surrounding circumstances fail to reveal specific
intention as to the meaning of the word. Cases which concede to an
adoption statute of the broad type a place of significance among the
circumstances where other factors are present 79 do not oppose this
concept. It is something else to say, however, as has been said of some
adoption statutes, that they reflect no light on the inquiry as to a testator's intention and may thus be dismissed from discussion,8° or that they
. are of no particular aid in construing the instrument. 81 On the contrary,
as Vice Chancellor Backes said in Dulfon v. Keasbey: 82
" ... Where the testamentary intention is indefinite or obscure
an adopted child may take under it if his status answers the description of the will. The statutory system supplies the intention; he
tak~ by designation of the system."
Mention has been made that the distinction between adoption
statutes with narrow status-conferring provisions and those couched in
sweeping terms is sometimes overlooked. While other cases may be
cited in which courts have shown a failure to recognize this distinction,83
78

Id., 96 N.J. Eq. at 558-559.
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Lichter
v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
80
Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 A. 601 (1918).
81
Wilder v. Butler, 116 Me. 389, 102 A. 110 (1917); Ahlmeyer v. Miller,
102 N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), affirmed 103 N.J. L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1<J27).
82
III N.J. Eq. 223 at 227, 162 A. 102· (1932).
88
See, for instance, Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910), and
Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930). And compaxe Matter of
Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910) and Matter of Conant's Estat~, 144 Misc.
743, 259 N.Y.S. 885 (1932).
79
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they are probably typified by Lichter v. Thier_s,84 where the court, concerned with the question whether an adoptee of the testator's granddaughter was a "child" of the latter within the meaning of the will,
seems to have lost sight of the terms of the Wisconsin statute, which
was taken from the original Massachusetts statute and directed that
the adopted child should be deemed for purposes of inheritance and
all other legal consequences and incidents of the· natural relation of
parent and child, the same to all intents and purposes as if born to
the adopters in lawful wedlock. Without indicating cognizance of the
limited terms of the Alabama, Pennsylvania and Maine statutes, or
of the later restrictive amendment to the Massachusetts statute, the court
not only relied upon Russell v. Russell,85 but referred, as being "directly in point," to Schafer v. Eneu,86 a Maine case,87 and two decisions
rendered under the restrictive amendment to the Massachusetts
statute. 88
Disaffiliation thrqugh adoption by another.-Assuming A is otherwise within an instrument's designation of the "child or children" of B,
by reason of being the natural child of B, will the quoted words, standing alone, still embrace A if he is adopted by C? The problem relates
to whether the provisions of the adoption stat~te with respect to release
of the child and his natural parents from the child-parent relationship
are to be taken as supplying a prima facie meaning to "child" or "children" which would exclude the adoptee. It has been suggested that
this is not the effect of most of the adoption statutes.89 That it is the result of some of them, however, is rather clear.90 An analogous situation
can arise where A, once adopted by B, is later adopted by C.91 The
problem, however, is not a frequent one.
3. "Grandchildren,"'"brothers and sisters," "nephews and nieces," etc.
The words "grandchildren," "brothers and sisters," "nephews and
nieces," and similar expressions can, of course, be translated into terms
of "children" of particular parents. So, instances may be cited in con139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
84 Ala. 48, 3' S. 900 (1887). In this case the court noted the distinction between the narrow statute with which it was concerned and a broad one like that involved in Lichter v. Thiers.
86
54 Pa. 304 (1867).
87
Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68 A. 821 (1907).
88
Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, II N.E. 729 (1887); Blodgett v. Stowell,
189 Mass. 142, 75 N.E. 138 (1905).
,
89
3 PROPERTY RESTA;rEMENT, § 288 (1940).
90
See Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood, 98 Conn. 337, 119 A. 218 (1922).
91
See dissenting opinion in Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App.
Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937).
84
85
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nection with the present subject where wills have referred both to the
testator's grandchildren and the children of his children,92 or both to his
nephews and nieces and the children of his brothers and sisters.98 An
argument can thus be made that if an adoption statute elevates an
adoptee to a child's status and thereby supplies a prima facie meaning
for the word "child" or "children" as used in a will or other private
instrument,9~ the statute should have corresponding significance where
the words ·are "grandchildren," "brothers and sisters," etc. This is
substantially the view taken by one court in discussing the question
whether, by reference to his "grandchildren," the testator should be
deemed to have intended to include an adopted child of his son, where
the pertinent statute directed that the adoptee should be the child of the
adopter "for every purpose." 95 Some support for the same position can
be gleaned from a few other .cases.96
But while many of the statutes in terms established the adoptee as
the "child" of the adopter, they do not declare him to be the "grandchild" of the adopter's parents or the "nephew" of the adopter's brothers and sisters or otherwise by express language relate him to the
adopter's kin; except that in some jurisdictions reciprocal rights of inheritance only are bestowed as between the adoptee and relatives generally of the adopter, 97 or as between the adoptee and the natural
children of the adopter; 98 and except further that there is a provision
in the New York statute that foster children and natural children shall
have "all the rights of fraternal relationship, including the right of inheritance from each other." 99 The Georgia statute, indeed, after reciting effects of the adoption between adopter and adoptee, stipulates that
to all other persons the adopted child shall stand as if no· such act of
adoption had been taken.100
92

Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939); Matter of Conant's
Estate, 144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y.S. 885 (1932).
98
Matter of Haight, 63 Misc. 624, II8 N.Y.S. 745 (1909).
9 ~ See supra, II, A, 2.
93
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S:W. (2d) 685 (1934).
96
See Adrian v. Koch, 83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914), affirmed 84 N.J. Eq.
195, 93 A. 1083 (1915); Matter of Levy's Estate, 138 Misc. 670, 245 N.Y.S. 710
(r9z.7).
97
See, for example, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1943) tit. 20, § 102; S.D. Code
(1939) § 14.0407, as amended, S.D. Laws, 1943, c. 50; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1943) § 1699-13.
98
See, for example, N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 9:3-9; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1925) art. 46a; W. Va. Acts, 1943, pp. 153-154.
99
N.Y. Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, 1941) § I 15.
100
Ga. Code (Supp. 1943) § 74-414.
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The general leaning of the courts, moreover, particularly where the
adoption statute is not overly generous to the adoptee, is that notwithstanding the statute may make the adoptee the "child" of the adopter
for some purposes, it does not make him, for example, the "grandchild"
of the adopter's parents,101 or the "nephew'' of the adopter's brothers
and sisters, within the meaning of those terms as employed in a will.
The idea is succinctly put by Surrogate Evans thus: "There is no such
person as a grandchild by adoption." 10·2 And with respect to the New
Zealand law the same point has been stated in this way: "The statute
•.. does not inferentially establish relationships other than the relationship of parent and child." 103
Natural children of adoptee.-A possible problem is whether children born in wedlock to an adoptee are entitled to share in a gift to
"grandchildren" of the adopter. Considering the term of designation
alone, the answer would seem to depend properly upon whether the
adoptee would be deemed a child of the adopter if the instrument referred to the ::i,dopter's child or children.
To illustrate the nature of the question, though at the risk of bringing into the discussion matters of context, which are treated separately
hereinafter, reference is made to Clarke v. Rathbone.104 In that case
the testator had adopted his grandchild, A, and by his will directed an
equal d~stribution of trust principal, upon the death of all the testator's children, among such of his grandchildren as should then be living,
per capita; but in the same article of the will he provided that A should
not ·share in the estate as one of his children, but should take a grandchild's share only. A died before the distribution date, leaving the defendant, his lawful natural child, who outlived the last of the testator's
children. In equity proceedings instituted by the testamentary trustees
for instructions, the defendant claimed to be a grandchild of the testator
within the meaning of the will and entitled to a share of the trust principal as a grandchild of the testator, even though his natural status was
101

See Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925); Parke v. Parke's
Exr, 295 Ky. 634, 175 S.W. (2d) 141 (1943); Woodcock's Appeal, 103 Me. 214, 68
A. 821 (1907); Dulfon v. Keasbey, l l l N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939); Matter of
Marsh's Estate, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y.S. 514 (1932); Matter of Conant's Estate,
144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y.S. 885 (1932); Matter of Wait's Estate, (N.Y. Surr. 1943)
42 N.Y.S. (2d) 735; Trustees, Executors & Agency Co., Ltd. v. Rowley, [1939]
N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 146.
102
Matter of Haight, 63 Misc. 624, II8 N.Y.S. 745 (1909); Trustees, Executors & Agency Co., Ltd. v. Rowley, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 146.
103
Trustees, Executors & Agency Co., Ltd. v. Rowley, [1939] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.)
146 at 150.
104
.221 Mass. 574, 109 N.E. 651 (1915).
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that of a great-grandchild. Had it not been for the provision in the will
which limited A's share and, inferentially, his status under the will to
that of a grandchild there might have been little question but that the
defendant would have taken as a grandchild; but the court understandably felt that in confining A's status, fo; the purposes of the will,
to his natural position as a grandchild, the testator impliedly also restricted the defendant's status under the will to that of a gi:eat-grandchild, who would not take .
.4• "Issue," "descendants," etc.
Both in common and technical usage the words "issue," "lawful
issue," "descendants," and similar terms 105 probably carry a stronger
connotation of blood relationship than the word "children." In a particular case, of course, they may be mere synonyms for "children," in
which event the question whether an adoptee is included within them is
only a repetition of the question whether he is included within the term
"children." 106 The frequency with which the words "issue" ( or "lawful
issue," "legal issue," etc.) and "children" are used indiscriminately in a
will to designate the same class of persons is well known.107
As more artfully employed, however, the words "children" and
"issue" are not synonymous, and courts have indicated that such a distinction between the meaning of the words exists as suggests the more
ready exclusion of adoptees from the term "issue" than from "chil105 By preliminary construction a word which is not normally within this category
may be brought within it. See, for example, among cases included in the scope of this
subject, Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545, in which the word "heirs"
in a will was treated as equivalent to "issue."
106
Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689 (1921); Ansonia
Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927); Huxley v. Security Trust
Co., (Del; Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679; In re a Deed of Trust, Peddle v. Beattie,
[1933] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 696. See also In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d)
340 (1940).
,
107
Apparent instances of such indiscriminate use of the words, among cases with
which the present subdivision deals include Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn.
61, II2 A. 689 (1921); Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588
(1927); Huxley v.. Security Trust Co., (Del. Ch. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 679; Smith v.
Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925); Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262
(1874); Gallagher v. Sullivan, 251 Mass. 552, 146 N.E. 769 (1925); Dulfon v.
Keasbey, I I I N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall,
125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A.
(2d) 340 (1940); Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474 (1919);
Matter of Cotheal's Estate, 121 Misc. 665, 202 N.Y.S. 268 (1923); Rodgers v. Miller,
43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932); Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76,
151 A. 131 (1930); In re a Deed of Trust, Peddle v. Beattie, [1933] N.Z.L.R.
(S.C.) 696. Compare Mooney v. Tolles, II I Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930), in which
the words "lawful children" and "lawful issue" were treated as having distinct meanings notwithstanding some indications that the testator used them indiscriminately.
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dren." 108 By describing the prima facie meaning of "issue" to be that of
"heirs of the body" 109 or "descendants," 110 a court takes a step, at once
easy and long, toward elimination of adoptees from. the term. And if
the testator has referred to "issue" and "heirs of the body" or "bodily
heirs" indiscriminately, support for such a prima facie meaning is available from the context.111 Then, too, etymologically the word "issue"
tends to imply a physical springing from the ancestor, not an adoption.112
At any rate a meanin.g of blood relationship, to the exclusion of relationship by adoption, has been ascribed to the term.113 The same may
108
Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N.E. 446, 55 N.E. 510 (1899); Virgin
v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 A. 520 (1903); Dulfon v. Keasbey, III N.J. Eq. 223,
162 A. 102 (1932); In re Horiana Kingi, Thompson v. Eruiti Tamahau Kingi,
[1937] N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 1025.
109
Wyeth v. Merchant, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 785, affirmed (C.C.A.
8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 242; Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A.
689 (1921); Hall v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Miller v. Wick, 3u
Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887);
In re Fisler, 133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943), affirming 131 N.J. Eq. 310,
25 A. (2d) 265 (1942); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932);
Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3 A. (2d) 218 (1938). See also Haver v.
Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924); Love v. Love, 179 N.C. II5, IOI
S.E. 562 (1919). But compare Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262 (1874), in which the
technical distinction between "issue" and "heirs of the body" is observed.
110
Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Hall v.
Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Miller v. Wick, 3II Ill. 269, 142 N.E.
490 (1924); N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Biele, 161 N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 3u (1899);
Matter of Hoyt's Estate, 120 Misc. 188, 197 N.Y.S. 828 (1923); Matter of Cotheal's
Estate, 121 Misc. 665, 202 N.Y.S. 268 (1923); Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174
Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862 (1940); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1944) 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 180; Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. 526, 3 A. (2d) 218
(1938); Smith v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931); In re Smith's Will, 95
Vt. 97, 112 A. 897 (1921). And see Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood, 98 Conn.
337, II9 A. 218 (1922); Mooney v.'Tolles, III Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930); In re
Holden, 207 Minn. 2II, 291 N.W. 104 (1940); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644,
35 A. 882 (1896).
111
Blakerv. Blaker, 131 Kan. 833,298 P. 517 (1930); Gravesv. Graves, 349
Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942). In Reinhard v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 306
(1936) ·the testator referred to "issue of her body."
112 Miller v. Wick, 31 I Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924); Dulfon v. Keasbey, I II
N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932). Perhaps this is more true of female than male
ancestors. For an interesting discussion of the etymology of "issue" and "child," see
O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F. (2d)
956, cert. denied 312 U.S. 707, 61 S. Ct. 829 (1941).
113
Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d) 420 (1942); Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862 (1940). A technical connotation of
blood relationship in the word "issue," as used in a will or deed, was conceded to
exist in England and the United States by the-majority of the court in O'Brien v.
Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 956, cert.
denied 312 U.S. 707, 61 S. Ct. 829 (1941).
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be said of the word "descendants" and variations thereof,1 H and of
"representatives," when used in the family sense.115
In Hawaii, where adoption had an origin independent of statute
and, according to the Supreme Court there, "the ancient customs of its
people had not only sanctioned adoptions and regarded adopted children as children of the blood but also considered the status as a very
sacred relationship without any trace of discrimination or prejudice toward adopted children in favor of blood children," 116 it has been held
that there is nothing about the word "issue," as used in a deed of trust,
which would necessarily connote a blood tie rather than_ a relationship
by adoption, as would be the case in England and most of the United
States, where the common law, to which adoption was unknown, "becomes the key to the situation," resembling "the subconscious mind
from which may be drawn the explanation of ... an otherwise obscure
thought or reaction of the conscious mind," and where "the common
law, as a sum total of a people's past legal experience or as their legal
heritage and background, may be drawn upon by an individual or by a
legislature whenever it may be necessary." 117
In the absence of factors of context or circumstance which would
lead to a different result, the prima facie meaning of "issue" or "descendants" at common law may by its own weight direct a decision
against inclusion of an adoptee within the designation.118 Or the prima
11
"'Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930) ("lineal descendants"); Hale v. Hale, 237 Ill. App. 410 (1925) ("female descendants"); Matter of
Marsh's Estate, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y.S. 514 (1932) ("descendants''); Matter of
Dudley's Estate, 168 Misc. 695, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 489 (1938) ("descendants").
115
Albright v. Albright, II6 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927). And see
Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. (2d) 420 (1942).
116
O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F.
(2d) 956, cert. denied 312 U.S. 707, 61 S. Ct. 829 (1941) at II6. Coke, C. J., dis-senting, however, was unable to find any basis in the history of adoption in Hawaii for
the statement made by the majority that ancient customs of adoption on the islands
made an adopted child the adopter's own or blood child.
117
O'Brjen v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104 (1939), affirmed (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F.
(2d) 956, cert. denied 312 U.S. 707, 61 S. Ct. 829 (1941).
118
This seems to have been largely true in Wyeth v. Merchant, (D.C. Mo. I 940)
34 F. Supp. 785, affirmed (C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 242; Wildman's Appeal,
III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930); Hale v. Hale, 237 Ill. App. 410 (1925);
Grundmann v. Wilde, 346 Mo. 327, 141 S.W. (2d) 778 (1940); Jenkins v. Jenkins,
64 N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887); Matter of Dudley's Estate, 168 Misc. 695, 6 N.Y.S.
(2d) 489 (1938); Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862
(1940); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 180;
Love v. Love, 179 N.C. I 15, IOI S.E. 562 (1919); Reinhard v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio L.
Abs. 306 (1936); Ashhurst's Estate, 133 Pa. Super. sz.6, 3 A. (2d) 218 (1938); In
re Smith's Will, 95 Vt. 97, 112 A. 897 (1921). See also Blaker v. Blaker, 131 Kan.
833, 293 P. 517 (1930).
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facie meaning may be but one of several considerations which lead the
court to that result.119 Conversely, the circumstances or context may
overcome the asserted primary meaning of a word like "issue" and
lead to the conclusion that an adoptee is within the term.120 •
With respect to the normal interpretation to be given to such words
as "issue" or "descendants" in a will or like instrument, what is the
effect of provisions of the adoption statute which, without giving a
direct answer to the problem at hand, describe generally the adoptee's
status after adoption? If the adoptee is to qualify at all as one of the
"issuen or "descendants" of the adopter, it must ordinarily be by reason of his elevation to that status through the offices of the statute.121
But only the Washington adoption statute in terms provides that the
adoptee shall be deemed "issue" of the adopter.122 The others at most
expressly make him a child of the adopter, and, this being so, it is always facile to say, when an instrument's reference is to issue or descen119

In some of the cases context, circumstances, or' a special statutory provision
supported the result. See Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, II2 A. 689 .
(1921); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 17 A. (2d) 517 (1941); Hall
v. Crandall, (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23
S.E. (2d) 420 (1942); Miller v. Wick, 311 Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924); Blodgett v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142, 75 N.E. 138 (1905); Gallagher v. Sullivan, 251 Mass.
552, 146 N.E. 769 (1925); Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153
N.E. 337 (1926); Dulfon v. Keasbey, 1 II N.J. Eq. 223, 162 A. 102 (1932); Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939); In re Fisler,
131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A. {2d) 265 (1942), affirmed 133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A. {2d)
894 (1943); N.Y. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 3II {1899);
Matter of Kingsbury, 192 App. Div. 206, 182 N.Y.S. 559 (1920), affirmed 230 N.Y.
580, 130 N.E. 901 (1920); Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div.
31, _295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. {2d) 164 (1937).;
Matter of Marsh's Estate, 143 Misc. 609, 257 N.Y.S. 514 (1932); Bealor's Estate, 23
Pa. Dist. 1117 (1914); Smithv. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154A. 272 (1931).
120
Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 136 A. 588 (1927), and In re
McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq~ 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940), illustrate the point. Matters of
special context and circumstances are treated infra, II, B and C.
121
As explained infra, II, C, 5, however, the date of the enactment of the statute,
when considered in connection with another date, such as that of the execution of the
instrument, may render the statute impertinent in the inquiry as to the meaning of a
term of designation. Instances where ,this was the situation with respect to the interpretation of the word "issue" include Wyeth v. Merchant, {D.C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp.
785, affirmed (C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 242, and Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H.
407, 14 A. 557 (1887).
122
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 1699-13, declares that the adoptee
"shall be to all intents and purposes, and for all legal incidents, the child, legal heir, and
lawful issue of his adopter or adopters." Compare Del. Laws, 1885, c: 612, § 3, which
provided that the adoption· decree should direct, inter alia, that after the adoption all
the duties, etc., recognized by law between parent and child should exist between the
adopters and the a_doptee or adoptees as fully and to all intents and purposes, as if the
adoptee or adoptees were the "lawful and natural offspring or issue" of the adopters.

1 945]

CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS

73 1

dants rather than to children, that "there is no such person as 'issue' by
adoption," 123 or that although the statute makes the adoptee a child of
the adopter, it does not make him a descendant.124 And if the statute
does not raise the adoptee even to the position of a child of the
adopter,125 a fortiori it would leave him short of being one of the
adopter's issue or descendants. 120
Where the statute makes an adoptee the child of the adopter "to all
intents and purposes" or employs similarly broad language to indicate
his status as a child of the adopter,121 the contention may be reasonably
advanced that, inasmuch as a child is issue of the first degree or a descendant of the first degree, an adoptee is by virtue of the statute to be
deemed presumptively within a designation of the adopter's "issue" or
"descendants," unless the context or circumstances establish a contrary
intention. Such, indeed, is the essence of several decisions,128 the leading
one of which is the Minnesota case of In re H olden. 129
123

Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322 at 323 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862

(1940).
124

Hale v. Hale, 237 lll. App. 410 (1925).
See the discussion supra, II, A, 2.
126
Narrowness of the status-conferring provisions of the adoption statute was acknowledged as a factor influencing the court against inclusion of an adoptee within the
term "issue" in Wyeth v. Merchant, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 785, affirmed
(C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 242, and Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322,
20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862 (1940). And see Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, ,23 S.W. (2d)
420 (1942); Miller v. Wick, 3 I I Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 -C1924); Graves v. Graves,.
349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942); Love v. Love, 179 N.C. II5, IOI S.E.
562 (1919). But the restricted scope of the adoption statute should not be stressed
beyond its appropriate signific,ance as it was in In re Smith's Will, 95 Vt. 97, 112 A.
897 ( I 92 I), where the court in construing a limitation in favor of "issue" of life
beneficiaries, testator's children, seems to have reasoned that, because an adoptee of one
of the testator's children could not have inherited from the testator, he was not "issue"
within the meaning of the will. By some legerdemain the court worked its argument to
the point where "issue" in the will was treated as meaning descendants of the testator
125

himself.
127

Statutes of the nature mentioned are collected supra, notes 54-66.
Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262 (1874); In re Holden, 207 Minn. 2II, 291
N.W. 104 (1940); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896); In re Olney,
27 R.I. 495, 63 A. 956 (1906). And see In re Truman, 27 R.I. 209, 61 A. 598
( I 90 5). The Hartwell case was not, as has been mistakenly asserted, overruled by
Smith v. Bradford, 5 I R.I. 289, I 54 A. 2 72 ( I 93 I), for although it was said in the latter
case that the former decision was to be considered as no longer binding authority in so
far as it was contrary to the rule that the intention of the testator shall govern when
ascertained, the court in the same sentence stated that the Hartwell case was not contrary to this rule. In Smith v. Bradford the decision turned on the fact that (a) there
was no gift to issue of the adopter, either expressly or by implication, and (b) even if
such a gift could be found, the context of the will evinced an intention to confine the
testator's bounty to those of his blood.
129
207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
·

128
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In the Holden case the testatrix by her will had established a trust
under which her share of a minimum mining royalty was to be paid to
her adopted son B for life, and the net excess royalties were to be divided equally among B and a niece and the wife of a nephew _of the
testatrix during B's life. If either of the other income beneficiaries predeceased B, her share of the income was to go to her lawful issue. At
B's death a third of the principal was to be paid to his "lawful issue,"
by right of representation. The rest was to be divided equally between
the other two income beneficiaries or their respective lawful issue, by
right of representation. If B should leave no "lawful issue;,' then
the principal should be divided equally between the- other income
beneficiaries or their lawful issue, by right of representation. The
testatrix, whose husband and the only child born of their marriage
had died many years before her own- death, was survived by B ( a
gardener and chauffeur whom she had adopted), three sisters and a
large number of nieces, nephews and other relations. Eleven years
after her death B and his wife adopted A in the State of Washington,
the decree reciting that A should be treated in all respects as the lawful
child of B and his wife and have the right of inheritance. The pertinent
Minnesota statute declared that the adoptee should become the legal
child of the adopters, and they should become his legal parents, with all
the rights and duties between them of natural parents and legitimate
child, including the right on the adoptee's part t'o inherit from the
adopters or their relatives, 180 the same as though he were the legitimate
chilc:l of the adopters. In proceedings for accounting and distribution
after B's death, A claimed a third of the corpus of the trust as B's
"lawful issue." Finding the circumstances and context to be neutral,
and regarding an adoptee as a "child" of the adopters by virtue of the
statute, the court was of the opinion that the technical meaning of
"issue" embraced an adoptee and that this technical meaning was controlling in the interpretation of the will, for want of evidence of a different intention. It was said in part:
"We believe that on principle the word 'issue' in a testamentary provision should be construed to include adopted children in
. virtue of our statutes where a contrary intention is not shown.
Whatever the holding, it results from the implications of the language of the will. What the implication shall be involves a choice
between the definitions of the statutes and meaning 'founded on
statutes and rules which have either been repealed or superseded.
180
The right of an adoptee under the Minnesota statute to inherit from relatives
of the adopter is a factor upon which the Holden case has been distinguished in decisions reached under statutory provisions less favorable to the adoptee. See, for example,
Matter of Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 862 (1940).
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We believe that we should find the legal implications in presentday statutes just as courts in other days and at other places found
a different implication in the rule which controlled their decisions.
Otherwise the legislative purpose is defeated by maintaining in
effect rules which it was intended to abolish." 131
Natural children of adoptee as "issue'' of adopter.-The question
whether reference in a private instrument to a person's "iss.ue" or "descendants" should prima facie include the natural children of an adoptee
of such person would seem logically to depend on whether the adoptee
himself would be deemed one of the children, issue, or descendants of
the adopter.132
Disqualification as "issue" thro~gh adoption by another.-One who
otherwise would be included among an ancestor's "issue" or "descendants," within the meaning of a will or other private instrument, might
conceivably be eliminated from the scope of the designation because of
his adoption by another person before his interest became indefeasibly
vested under the instrument. If the problem is regarded as governed
by the same general principles applicable to the analogous question
concerning an adoptee's inclusion as "issue" of the adopter, the strong
prima facie meaning of the words would doubtless exert its influence to
keep the adoptee within the group or class thus designated, and opposing that force would be the provisions of the adoption statutes which
tend to destroy relationships, rights and duties as between the adoptee
and his natural parents and kin. Where such provisions are couched in
broad language they may prevail in a situation of this kind.133
In the courts the problem is a rare one. It did present itself, however, to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Stamford ·Trust
Co. v. Lockwood.184 There a testator provided that his entire estate be
held in trust for the purpose of paying from the income an annuity to
his widow for life and distributing the rest of the income in certain proportions among his daughters G and L, his son H, and his granddaughter J, during their respective lives. On the death of H, G, Lor J the portion of principal from which his or her share of income had been payable
181

In re Holden, 207 Minn. 21 l at 227, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
In Smith v. Bradford, 51 R.I. 289, 154 A. 272 (1931), a bequest of shares
of bank stock to the testator's granddaughter for life, with provision for reversion to his
legal heirs if she should die "without issue, leavi!lg no children," was construed as
not to give the stock to the natural children of one whom the testator's granddaughter
adopted after his death, but who predeceased the granddaughter. The decision, however, turned on the absence of an implied gift to the issue or children of the granddaughter, even though natural, and also upon factors of special context and circumstances.
132

183
134

3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 288 (1940).
98 Conn. 337, II9 A. 218 (1922) .
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'Yas to go to his or her "lawful issue." One of H's children, B, living at
the testator's death in 1907, subsequently became the natural and lawful parent of A, who was legally adopted by a stranger in 1913. B died
in 1920 and H died in I 92 I. Jn proceedings for the distribution of the
portion of the trust from which H had been paid income, A claimed
as H's lawful issue. After concluding that as used in the will the term
"issue" was .a word of purchase, inclusive of descendants to every degree, that descendants of a deceased child or grandchild took per
stirpes, that the gifts in remainder vested in right on the testator's
death, with enjoyment only being postponed, and that "issue" were to
. be determined as of the testator's death, but that the class opened up to
take in afterborn issue, the court rejected the claim of A by saying that
at the time of the adoption, her father being then alive, she had no
vested interest in the corpus of the trust, and by force of the adoption
statute 'she ceased to be a child of B from the time of the adoption, so
that her right to participate per stirpes as a representative of B was lost
before his death.

5.

"Heirs of the body," "bodily heirs," etc.
The terms "bodily heirs" and "heirs of the body" are especially
strong in the prima facie force which they exert to exclude one related
by adoption only. This is indicated by the eagerness with which courts
identify the word "issue" with "heirs of the body" as a basis for saying
that on its face "issue" does not include one brought into the line of
,descent by adoption only.135 And courts have perfunctorily dismissed
any thought that an ~doptee was included within the words "heirs of the
body" or like expressions when actually used in private instruments.136
To neutralize or supplant the implications of blood relationship
involved in a term such as "heirs of the body," as used, for example, in
a will, the status-conferring provisions of an adoption statute manifestly
would have to be very broad. Possibly those which in substance declare
that the adoptee shall be the child of the adopters to all legal intents
and purposes, as though born to them in lawful wedlock, would suffice.
There seems to be no valid reason for doubting the power of a legislature to make such a change in the prima facie meaning of the term.137
135

See supra, II, A, 4.
Adams v. Merrill, 45 lnd. App. 315, 85 N.E. 114, 87 N.E. 36 (1908);
Blaker v. Blaker, I 3 I Kan. 833, 293 P. 517 (1930); Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47,
44 S.W. 761 (1898); Graves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W. (2d) 544 (1942);
Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289 (1901). See also Moffet v. Cash, 346
Ill. 287, 178 N.E. 658 (1931), dissenting opinion 346 Ill. 3II, 179 N.E. 186
(1931); Love v. Love, 179 N.C. II5, IOI S.E. 562 (1919).
137
But see Balch v. Johnson, 106 Tenn. 249, 61 S.W. 289 (1901), in W¥ich it
-

136
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And a decision such as In re H olden,188 to the effect that the technical
meaning of the word "issue" has been altered by the adoption statute in
Minnesota, would provide a serviceable analogy.
If the words "bodily heirs" or "heirs of the body" are employed as
words of limitation rather than of purchase, the effect of adoption with
respect thereto should be to raise problems of inheritance and construction of inheritance laws rather than problems of interpretation of the
instrument creating the limitation. That would seem to be true if the
words created in the ancestor a fee tail or a fee simple conditional. And
if statutes abolishing estates tail operate upon the limitation, changing
what would have been a fee tail into another estate or other estates in
a person or persons designated by the statutes, the problem which might
be injected into the situation by an adoption would more likely be one
of equivalence or nonequivalence within the meaning of terms employed by the statutes than a problem of identification under the will
or deed.
The point is illustrated by Clarkson v. Hatton, 139 where the court
had to consider a deed, dated I 857, to the grantor's son B and the
latter's "bodily heirs." B and his wife had no children or descendants
when the deed was made and none was thereafter born to them, but
they adopted A as their child and heir in I 8 87. After the death of B
and his wife, B's brothers and sisters brought ejectment against A's
curator, who claimed the fee was in A. By a statute enacted in I 855 it
had been provided that a conveyance or devise which would have
created an estate tail, as in this instance, should vest in the grantee or
devisee an estate for life only, and on his death the land should go to·
his "children" in fee, the issue or heirs of a deceased child taking such
child's share. The real question in the case, to which the court gave a
negative answer, thus became whether A took the statutory remainder
in fee as a "child" of B within the meaning of the statute abolishing fees
tail, not whether A was one of B's "bodily heirs" within the contemplation of the deed.
Adoptee's statutory incapacity to take as heir of body of adopter.The original Massachusetts adoption statute, while declaring broadly
that the adoptee should be deemed the child of the parents by adoption,
for purposes of inheritance and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and children, just as though
the adoptee had been born to them in lawful wedlock, made an excepwas said that the adoption statute there involved did not, and in the natw-e of things
"could not," make an adoptee "a bodily heir" of the adopter.
188
207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
139
143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898).
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tion in these words: "saving only that he shall not be deemed to be
capable of taking property· expressly limited to the 'heirs of the body
or bodies of such petitioner or petitioners." 140 The substance of this exception became embodied in the adoption statutes of about eighteen
other jurisdictions.141
It seems fairly clear, in view of the origin of the provision in question at a time when Massachusetts recognized the fee tail, that it was
directed against an adoptee's inheritance of an estate tail and not against
his taking property by purchase. This conclusion finds support in other
considerations also. First, in its usual form the provision declares t~at
the adoptee shall not be "capable" of taking, etc. Language of capacity
is appropriate to inheritance, but hardly to acquisition by purchase,
where intention is the controlling guide. The provision is not stated in
terms of presumption, rebuttable by evidence of a contrary intent, but
as a principle of law. Second, as found in the statutes of some states
the provision actually uses the word "inherit" or "inheriting" instead
of "take" or "taking." 142 Third, the provision is usually accompanied
by another one, also logically applicable to inheritance, to the effect that
the adoptee shall not be capable of taking property from the lineal or
-collateral kindred of the adopters by right of representation.148 Fourth,
having abolished by statute the inheritable estate of fee tail, the Massachusetts legislature decided there was no further necessity for the
exception in the adoption statute as to taking property expressly limited
to the heirs of the body of the adopter, and accordingly eliminated the
exception.144
Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1851, c. 324, § 6.
Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) § n47; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941)
c. 3, § 165 (words "heirs of the" omitted, apparently through inadvertence, from expression "heirs. of the body") ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( l 930) c. So, § 38; Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (1942) § 9614; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 345, § 5; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp.
1940) § 9:3-9; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:39-7; Ohio Gen. Code (Supp. 1943)
§ 10512-23; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 10, § 52; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940)
§ 63-407; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 420, § 6; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3336,
as amended, Vt. Laws, 1941, p. 61; W. Va. Acts, 1943, pp. 153-154; Wis. Stat.
(1943) § 322.07. The equivalent of the provision is also found in statutes of Manitoba,
New South Wales, New Zealand, and South Australia. Man. Rev. Stat. (1940) c. 32,
§ 96; N.S.W. Stat., 1939, p. 257; N.Z. Consol. Stat. (1908) vol. 2, p. 835; S. Aust.
Stat. (Reprint, 1936) vol. 1, p. 145 .
42
.1
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. So,§ 38; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 9614; Ohio
Gen. Code Ann. (Supp. 1943) § 105 l 2-23.
148
Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) § n47; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3,
§ 165; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. So,§ 38; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 9:3-9; N.J.
Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:39-7; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 10, § 52; Ore. Comp. Laws
Ann. (1940) § 63-407; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 420, § 6; W. Va. Acts, 1943,
pp. 153-154; N.Z. Consol. Stat. (1908) vol. 2, p. 835; S. Aust. Stat. (Reprint, 1936)
vol. 1, p. 145.
·
144
Mass. Acts, 1876, c. 213.
140

141
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By virtue of statutes abolishing the fee tail as an estate successively
inheritable, the exception under discussion has become something of a
legal anachronism in most states where it is found. 145 If, as would appear to be true, the exception has reference to a limitation under which
the adopter is the first taker, rather than to an• immediate gift to the
heirs of his body,146 then the exception would have no relevancy in a
jurisdiction where the statute abolishing ·estates tail gives the first taker
a fee simple absolute. If the statute barring entails creates in the
adopter, as first taker, a life estate only, with remainder in fee simple
absolute to others, such as his children, designated by the statute, then
the exception in the adoption statute would have pertinence only with
respect to the question whether the adoptee could take the statutory fee
in remainder, and this would be a question of construction of statute,
not of the instrument declaring the limitation.147 And if the statute
barring entails leaves an estate tail in the adopter for life only, with fee
simple absolute thereafter in those who would have taken from him a
fee tail, this too would appear as an acquisition by inheritance or statute
rather than a taking by purchase under will or deed.
The courts have not been very articulate on the point. A few have
stated rather definitely, however, that the statutory exception which
precludes an adoptee from taking property expressly limited to the heirs
of the body of the adopter is concerned with inheritance and the laws
of descent, not with the conveyor's intention or with acquisition of property by purchase.148 Others have indicated the same attitude by saying
that the words "heirs of the body" in the exception are used in their
primary technical sense (that is, as words of limitation).149 Hence, a
limitation to the children or issue of the adopter is ordinarily said not to
be within the exception.150 And the requirement of the exception that
145
For a list of the American statutes abolishing the estate tail, see l PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, c. 5, introductory note ( 1940). In Oregon the statutory exception in
question may have significance to prevent an adoptee from inheriting a fee simple conditional.
146
Accord: In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940).
147
Id. And see Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761 (1898).
148
In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940) (in which the
statutory exception was said to regulate descents, not state a canon for the interpretation
of wills); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A. 882 (1896); Public Trustee v. Pilington, 31 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 770 (1912). The same view is taken in Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 A. 948 (1892), where the question was whether an adoptee
could claim the benefit of an anti-lapse statute. See also Ahlmeyer v. Miller, 102
N.J. L. 54, 131 A. 54 (1925), affirmed 103 N.J. L. 617, 137 A. 543 (1927).
149
Sewall v. Roberts, II5 Mass. 262 (1874); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35
A. 882 (1896); In re Olney, 27 R.I. 495, 63 A. 956 (1906).
150
Tirrell v. Bacon, (C.C. Mass. 1880) 3 F. 62; Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass.
262 (1874); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887); In re McEwan,
128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940); Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 644, 35 A.
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the limitation to the heirs of the body must be express has been given
literal interpretation.151 But in a number of instances the exception may
have been deemed to relate to a bodily heir's acquisition of property by
purchase directly under the will or other instrument creating the limitation, and not as dealing solely with inheritance or passing of property
under statutes of entail.152

6. "Heirs,". "next of kin," etc.
Attention is turned to the question whether the terms "heirs," "law-

ful heirs," "heirs at law," "next of kin," and similar expressions, standing alone,· are to be deemed to include adoptees, assuming that these
words are used in a broad sense and are not interpreted preliminarily
to mean "children" or one of the other terms already considered.153
Pretermitted here is discussion of the effect of an express statute on
the point,154 special context or circumstance,155 or interim changes in the
882 (1896); In re Olney, 27 R.I. 495, 63 A. 956 (1906). But see expressions to the
contrary in Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924); and In re Fisler,
133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A. (2d) 894 (1943), affirming 131 N.J. Eq, 310, 25 A. (2d)
265 (1942). And compare 19 Ohio Ops. 405 (1941); 20 Ohio Ops. 250 (1941);
8 Ohio St. L. J. 113 (1941); 1 West. Res. L. N. 10 (1941).
151
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 A. 557 (1887); In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq.
140, 15 A. (2d) 340 (1940). ·
152
See Miller v. Wick, 3u Ill. 269, 142 N.E. 490 (1924) ;In re Holden, 207
Minn. 2II, 291 N.W. 104 (1940); Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661
(1924); Trenton Union Trust Co. v. Gane, 125 N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) II2 (1939),
affirmed 126 N.J. Eq. 273, 8 A. (2d) 708 (1939); In re Fisler, 133 N.J. Eq. 421,
30 A. (2d) 894 (1943), affirming 131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A. (2d) 265 (1942).
153
Instances in which, by preliminary construction, the term "heirs" or "legal
heirs" was deemed to mean "children," "issue," or "descendants" only, so that the real
question was whether the latter words embraced an adoptee, include Hall v. Crandall,
(Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 545; Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E. (2d)
381 (1943); Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N.E. 956 (1910); Smith v.
Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788 (1925); Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343,
II5 N.E. 588 (1917); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930);
Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, 126 A. 661 (1924). And see Dyer v. Lane, 202
Ark. 571, 151 S.W. (2d) 678 (1941). There may be a statutory presumption that
the word "heirs" means "children." See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936)
§ 85-504.
154 See, in this connection, Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, II N.E. 729 (1887);
Blodgett v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142, 75 N.E. 138 (1905); Walcott v. Robinson, 214
Mass. 172, 100 N.E. no9 (1913); Matter of Kingsbury, 192 App. Div. 206, 182
N.Y.S. 559 (1920), affirmed 230 N.Y. 580, 130 N.E. 901 (1920); Morton v.
American Security & T. Co., 251 App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed
276 N.Y, 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937).
.
n 5 As illustrating the effect of special context or circumstances on whether an
ado_Rtee is within a reference to "heirs" or "next of kin," see Warden v. Overman, 155
lbwa 1, 135 N.W~ 649 (1912); Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680
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general statutory provisions. 156
In most states expressions like "heirs" and "next of kin," when
used in wills and other private instruments, are regarded as having
prima facie reference to those who take under the pertinent laws of
descent and distribution. 157 On its face, therefore, the designation in
such an instrument of a person's heirs or next of kin will include one
related to him by adoption, if by the applicable statute one.so related
would share in his estate in event of his death intestate.158
The adoptee having under the laws of virtually all the states a
general right of inheritance from the adopter,159 there has usually been
little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that reference in a will or deed
t~ a person's "heirs," "heirs generally," "legal heirs," or "heirs at
law" prima facie includes his adoptee.160 A stronger argument for in(1940); Morrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888); Reinders v.
Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887); Morton v. American Security & T. Co.,
251 App. Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d)
164 (1937); Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, II7 S.W. (2d) 413 (1938).
156
See, for instance, Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900);
Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co. 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Smith v. Hunter,
86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912); Kohler's Estate, 199 Pa. 455, 49 A. 286
(1901).
157
Casner, "Construction of Gifts to 'Heirs' and the Like," 53 HARV. L. REv.
207 at 208-209 (1939).
iss As to the effect of adoption on inheritance generally, see Kuhlmann, "Intestate
Succession by and from the Adopted Child," 28 WASH. UN1v. L. Q. 221 (1943).
159
Compare such limitations on the adoptee's right of inheritance from the adopter
as the statute may impose directly, as with respect to property limited expressly to the
heirs of the body of the adopter (supra, II, A, 5), or indirectly, as through special
terms of the adoption agreement or decree (e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 80, § 38;
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 1269; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 9570; Wyo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ( Courtright, l 93 l) § 20-2 IO.
160
Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900); Uitz v. Upham, 177
Mich. 351, 143 N.W. 66 (1913); Rauch v. Metz, (Mo. 1919) 212 S.W. 357; St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W. (2d) 685 (1934); Brock v.
Dorman, 339 Mo. 6II, 98 S.W. (2d) 672 (1936); Trenton Union Trust Co. v. Gane,
125 N.J. Eq. 389, 6 A. (2d) II2 (1939), affirmed 126 N.J. Eq. 273, 8 A. (2d) 708
(1939); Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Smith
v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912); Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157,
170 N.E. 601 (1929); Stevenson's Estate, 47 Pa. Dist. & Co. 215 (1943); Dickenson
v. Buck, 169 Va. 39, 192 S.E. 748 (1937); Re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks,
[1925] 3 Dom. L. R. (C.A. Br. Col.) 854. In Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39 at
44, 192 S.E. 748 (1937), the court said:
"The broad language of the statute has made the . . . [ adoptee] the heir of the
adopting parent just as though he were a child by bir~h. The adopted child and the
child by birth stand alike and equally as the heirs of the foster parent. Therefore the
• • • [ adoptee] was the sole heir at law or 'legal heir' of . . . the foster father and life
tenant at the time of the latter's death. • • .
"The intention of the testator must control. His language expressed in the will is
so clear and plain that there can be no doubt as to what he intended. This being a case
of testacy we must construe the will and the adoption statute together. If it were a'
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clusion of the adoptee is presented if the designation expressly denotes
those who would take from the adopter under the intestate laws,1 61 or if
the reference is to the adopter's heirs or next of kin according to or as
determined by .the intestate laws.162
In a few instances, however, it has been suggested that in the absence of an allusion to the laws of intestate succession, an adoptee would
not be included within the adopter's "heirs or next of kin," as contemplated in a will, because of a connotation of blood relationship involved in the use of those words.163 And an asserted normal meaning
of blood relationship attributed to the expression "nearest of kin" became the basis of a Connecticut decision that an adoptee was not one of
the adopter's "nearest of kin" under the will of the adopter's father. 164
A similar conclusion was reached in Pennsylvania with respect to the
word "kin." 165 The idea has also been put forward that the term "lawful heirs" ordinarily signifies those who take by virtue of the law, and
that one who becomes the heir of another through adoption by deed is
not one of the adopter's lawful heirs, because his status as an heir is the
result not of law but of deed.166
case of intestacy then the adoption statute and the statute of descents and distributions
would necessarily have to be read together. When we consider the devise and the
adopt~on statute together, it is obvious that the devise in remainder is to tjie legal
heirs of . • . [ the adopter] and the adoption statute creates the legal heir of the life
tenant and places the . . . [ adoptee] in that position."
161
Dodin v. Dodin, 16 App. Div. 42, 44 N.Y.S. 800 (1897), affirmed 162 N.Y.
635, 57 N.E. II08 (1900); Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346 (1879); Kohler's Estate,
199 Pa. 455, 49 A. 286 (1901).
162
Kemp v. N.Y. Produce Exchange, 34 App. Div. 175, 54 N.Y.S. 678 (1898);
U.S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 135 .N.Y.S. 849 (1912); Matter of
Reeker's Estate, 178 Misc. 449, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 365 (1942); Matter of Bates' Will,
173 Misc. 703, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 64 (1940).
163
Matter of Reeker's Estate, 178 Misc. 449, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 365 (1942). And
see the statement to the same effect in Morton v. American Security & T. Co., 251 App.
Div. 31, 295 N.Y.S. 556 (1937), affirmed. 276 N.Y. 475, 12 N.E. (2d) 164 (1937).
At least as to the words "heirs at law," this is difficult to reconcile with Gilliam v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906). Compare N.Y. Decedents'
Estate Law (McKinney, 1938) § 47-c, which now gives to the words "heirs" and
"next of kin" a prima facie meaning inclusive of those who would take in event of
intestacy.
164 Wildman's Appeal, III Conn. 683, 151 A. 265 (1930). Maltbie, J., dissenting, said that the words "nearest of kin" have a generally accepted meaning which is
not dependent upon blood relationship. In Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338,
7 S.W. 288 (1887), the word "nearest" in the expression "nearest and lawful heirs"
was also a factor which helped induce the court to decide that the whole expression
referred to relatives by blood, to the exclusion of an adoptee.
165
Freeman's Estate (No. 1), 40 Pa. Super. 31 (1909). See Casner, "Construction of Gifts to 'Heirs' and the Like," 53 HARV. L. REv. 207 at 2II (1939).
166
Morrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888); Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, 7 S.W. 288 (1887). These cases were cited in Cook v. Under-
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Cases may likewise be found in which a decision excluding the
adoptee from taking a remainder limited to the life tenant's "heirs" was
the apparent result of the court's confusion of the question by treating
the limitation as though it read in favor. of the heirs of the grantor or
testator, parent of the adopter.167 The distinction should not require
elaboration. Except where the law gives the adoptee the right of inheritance from the adopter's relatives,168 the adoptee is not, within the
normal meaning of the words as used in a will or deed, an "heir" or
"next of kin" of such relatives, whether they be the testator or grantor
himself 1 69 or others.110
Natural children of adoptee as "heirs" or "next of kin."-Whether
children born to an adoptee are within the usual meaning• of a reference
to another's "heirs" or "next of kin" should ordinarily depend on
whether the adoptee himself would qualify under the term. An illustration of the problem is afforded by Young v. Stearns. 171 The will of
testatrix, executed in r870, gave all of her estate to her husband for
life, with provision that after his death it should go to the "lawful
heirs" of the testatrix. In r 87 r the testatrix and her husband adopted
A, who, having married and borne the respondents, died in r896. Testatrix died in I 897 survived by respondents and her sister, and leaving
as part of her estate an undivided moiety in land of which her sister
owned the other undivided half interest. As residuary devisees of the
sister of the testatrix, the petitioners instituted a proceeding in the land
wood, 209 Iowa 641, 228 N.W. 629 (1930), for the proposition that the word
"heirs" does not, of its own force, include an adoptee of the person to whom reference
is made. In turn the Cook case was cited with approval on the latter point in Woods
v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940).
167
Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. (2d) 680 (1940); In re Clarke's
Estate, 125 Neb. 625, 251 N.W. 279 (1933). And see dictum resulting from the same
type of confusion in Matter of Sandford's Estate, 160 Misc. 898, 290 N.Y.S. 959
(1936), modified on another point 250 App. Div. 310, 293 N.Y.S. 991 (1937), and
277 N.Y. 323, 14 N.E. (2d) 374 (1938).
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court _for registration of title to the property. Thus the question arose
whether the respondents or the sister of the testatrix constituted her
"lawful heirs" within the meaning of the will. In holding for the respondents the court had merely to go through the successive steps of
finding that A herself, if she had survived the testatrix, would have
taken as her "lawful heir" pursuant to the provisions of the adoption
statute, and then looking to the customary declaration in the statute of
descents which gives to the children or issue of an intestate's deceased
child the same share by right of representation as the deceased child
would. have taken if living.
Disqualification from heirship through adoption by another.Many of the statutes expressly reserve to an adoptee the right to inherit
from its natural parents and relatives,112 and the same right may be
reserved by implication.178 In other states the adoption statute effects
a termination of the right of inheritance as between the adoptee and his
natural parents and relatives.174 Whether through adoption by a
stranger one who otherwise would have been a person's "heir" or "next
of kin" within the meaning of an instrument is to be deemed excluded
from the designation will rest mainly on whether the adoption statute
debars him from inheriting from his natural parents or relatives. Thus,
in Pennsylvania, where by statute enacted in r9r7 the adoptee's right
to inherit from or through his blood parents and relatives is terminated
when he is adopted by a stranger, it has been held that within the meaning of a trust agreement, dated r907, for the benefit of H and E
equally during their respective lives, with provision that upon the
death of either a half of the principal should be paid to his issue or,
in default of issue, to his "next of kin," H's sister, who was adopted by
a stranger in r 9 r r, was precluded from taking part of the principal
when H died in 1930.175

(To be concluded in the April issue)
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